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TORT LAW-Focusing on the Nature of the Defendant's
Control When Defining the Exclusive Control Element of
Res Ipsa Loquitur: Trujeque v. Service Merchandise Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue in Trujeque v. Service Merchandise Co. I was whether others'
access to a chair precluded its owner from having exclusive control over
that chair for the purpose of a res ipsa loquitur 2 claim. The New Mexico
Supreme Court held that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, exclusive
control was based on the defendant's control over the chair and not
others' access to it. The importance of this decision is that it provides
an alternative to New Mexico's traditional definition of the exclusive
control element.' This note examines the application of the exclusive
control element in New Mexico, analyzes how other jurisdictions apply
exclusive control, and explores the implications of the Trujeque decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
While waiting for her order to be processed, Plaintiff Carmen Trujeque
decided to sit in a chair that Defendant Service Merchandise Co. [here-
inafter Service Merchandise] provided for its customers' convenience. 4
When Trujeque sat in the chair, the chair collapsed. Trujeque fell and
injured her arm.' She filed suit against Service Merchandise for her
injuries. 6 The trial court ruled that Trujeque could only present her case
on the theory of res ipsa loquitur.7
1. 117 N.M. 388, 872 P.2d 361 (1994).
2. "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only when evidence establishes that in the ordinary
course of events an injury would not occur except through negligence or the person in exclusive
control of the injuring instrumentality." Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 391, 872 P.2d at 364 (citing N.M.
UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTON CIV. 13-1623; see Hepp v. Quickel Auto & Supply Co., 37 N.M. 525,
528, 25 P.2d 197, 199 (1933)). Res ipsa loquitur is based on an inference of negligence, not proof
of negligence. See id. at 393, 872 P.2d at 366 (citing Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240 (1913));
see also Strong v. Shaw, 96 N.M. 281, 283, 629 P.2d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1980) ("Res ipsa loquitur
is a rule of evidence, not of substantive tort law. Its sole function is to supply inferences from
which some negligent conduct can be found, without finding what the negligence was. The tenant
does not have to prove a specific act of negligence-only an inference .... ).
In order to rely on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the plaintiff must prove 1) that the injury
was proximately caused by an instrumentality which was under the exclusive control and management
of the defendant, and 2) that the event causing the injury was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur in the absence of negligence on the part of the person in control of the instrumentality. If
the plaintiff proves each of these propositions a jury may infer that the defendant was negligent.
See N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1623 (emphasis added).
3. Although the supreme court stated that they would not define exclusive control because it
was a self-explanatory phrase, the court proceeded to interpret exclusive control on the basis of its
past application. Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 390-93, 872 P.2d at 363-66. This interpretation of New
Mexico precedent is the functional equivalent of defining exclusive control.
4. Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 389, 872 P.2d at 362.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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At the close of trial, Service Merchandise offered a definition of
exclusive control that would require Trujeque to show that "others [besides
Service Merchandise] did not have an opportunity of equal access to the
instrumentality." 8 The trial court refused this instruction and instructed
the jury according to New Mexico Uniform Jury Instruction Civil 13-
1623. 9 Shortly thereafter, the jury asked for a precise definition of
exclusive control. 0 In spite of Trujeqve's objection, the trial judge in-
structed the jury according to Service Merchandise's proffered instruc-
tion." The jury returned a verdict for Service Merchandise.12 Trujeque
appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed."' The supreme court reversed
and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court's definition
of exclusive control was inappropriate. 4
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL
ELEMENT IN NEW MEXICO
Prior to Trujeque, many New Mexico decisions involving res ipsa
loquitur defined exclusive control as requiring the plaintiff to prove that
no one, except the defendant, had access to the object involved in the
accident.' 5 Such a definition has been criticized by other courts as "ri-
8. Id. The proposed instruction articulated the following standard of proof for the element of
exclusive control:
In order to prove that the defendant had exclusive control and management over
the instrumentality causing plaintiff's accident and injuries, plaintiff must show
from the evidence that others did not have an opportunity of equal access to the
instrumentality.
N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CIV. 13-1623. Service Merchandise based this definition on Gonzales
v. Shoprite Foods, Inc., 69 N.M. 95, 364 P.2d 352 (1961). The Gonzales court held that a store
did not have exclusive control over a stack of merchandise because numerous customers had equal
access to the merchandise. Id. at 101, 364 P.2d at 358.
9. See supra note 2.
10. See Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 390, 872 P.2d at 363.
II. Id.; see supra note 8.
12. See Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 390, 872 P.2d at 363.
13. Id. at 389, 872 P.2d at 362.
14. Id.
15. See Archibeque v. Homrich, 88 N.M. 527, 543 P.2d 820 (1975) (holding that owner of car
who was present did not have exclusive control over the car because the nonowner driver had access
to the car. Therefore, the owner was not liable for the nonowner's acts.); Waterman v. Ciesielski,
87 N.M. 25, 528 P.2d 884 (1974) (finding that defendant did not have exclusive control over the
unloading of a motor that fell because the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, had access to the
knowledge of the cause of the movement that resulted in the plaintiff's injuries.); Gonzales v.
Shoprite Foods, Inc., 69 N.M. 95, 364 P.2d 352 (1961) (holding that store owner did not have
exclusive control over stacked merchandise because patrons had access to the stack of merchandise.);
Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 575 (1955) (holding
that customer established the bottling company's exclusive control over a bottle with tainted contents
by showing that there was no reasonable opportunity for others to tamper with the bottle or its
contents.); Hepp v. Quickel Auto and Supply Co., 37 N.M. 525, 25 P.2d 197 (1933) ("It [res ipsa
loquitur] bases its chief claim to justification on the fact that ordinarily the cause of the injury is
accessible to the party charged and inaccessible to the person injured."1); Begay v. Livingston, 99
N.M. 359, 658 P.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding that hotel owner did not have exclusive control
over the gas supply in a guest's room because the guest had access to the supply. "The phrase
,exclusive control' . . . means 'the sole power . . . of defendant to superintend, direct or oversee'
the instrumentality.") (quoting Archibeque v. Homrich, 88 N.M. 527, 531, 543 P.2d 870, 874 (1975);
Harless v. Ewing, 81 N.M. 541, 469 P.2d 520 (Ct. App. 1970) (finding that defendant had exclusive
control over his truck because he maintained the truck and plaintiff did not have access to the
maintenance of the truck.).
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diculous" because it is "overly rigid" and "improper.' 6 This criticism
is based on the fact that the purpose of the exclusive control element
is to provide a basis on which the fact finder can draw an inference of
the defendant's negligence, not the plaintiffs negligence. 7
A. New Mexico Cases Analyzed by the Trujeque Court
In Tafoya v. Las Cruces Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,"s the plaintiff brought
an action against a bottling company for injuries caused by foreign matter
found in a bottle. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that res ipsa
loquitur was applicable because the bottling company had exclusive control
over the contents of the bottle. 9 The court concluded that the defendant
had exclusive control because there was "no reasonable probability that
the contents were tampered with by anyone else." ' 20 Thus, the Tafoya
court found that the exclusive control element depended on the plaintiff
showing that no one else had access to the bottle or its contents.2'
In 1970, the court of appeals defined exclusive control in a similar
manner. In Harless v. Ewing,22 a truck lessee's employee brought an
action based on res ipsa loquitur for injuries that resulted when one of
the truck's wheels exploded. 23 The court held that the employee established
the defendant lessor's exclusive control over the wheel when the employee
showed that he did not have access to the maintenance of the truck. 24
In Begay v. Livingston,25 a hotel guest was asphyxiated by carbon
monoxide that escaped from a gas heater in a hotel room. 26 The personal
representative of the deceased guest brought suit against the hotel owner,
claiming that under res ipsa loquitur, the owner had exclusive control
of the heater. 27 The Begay court stated that "the phrase 'exclusive control
and management' . . . means 'the sole power of authority of the defendant
to superintend, direct or oversee' the instrumentality. ' 2 The court held
that because the deceased could have used the heater, the hotel owner
did not have the "sole power to superintend, direct, or oversee" the
heater .29
16. Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 392, 872 P.2d at 365. See Judson v. Camelot Food, Inc., 756 P.2d
1198, 1201 n.3 (Nev. 1988) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON THE LAW OF
TORTS 249-50 (5th ed. 1984)).
17. See Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 392, 872 P.2d at 365; Strong v. Shaw, 96 N.M. 281, 283, 629
P.2d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1980); Finocchio v. Crest Hollow Club at Woodbury, Inc., 584 N.Y.S.2d
201, 202 (N.Y. 1992); Rose v. Melody Lane of Wilshire, 247 P.2d 335, 338 (Cal. 1952).
18. 59 N.M. 43, 278 P.2d 575 (1955).
19. Id. at 50, 278 P.2d at 582.
20. Id. at 47, 278 P.2d at 579.
21. Id.
22. 81 N.M. 541, 469 P.2d 520 (Ct. App. 1970).
23. Id. at 543-44, 469 P.2d 522-23.
24. Id. at 544, 469 P.2d at 523.
25. 99 N.M. 359, 658 P.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 98 N.M. 712, 652
P.2d 734 (1982).
26. Id. at 361, 658 P.2d at 436.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 363, 658 P.2d at 438.
29. Id. "The doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] does not apply when the injury might have been
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These three cases all interpret exclusive control by focusing on others'
access to the object. Such analysis represents the common interpretation
of the exclusive control element in New Mexico.3 0 The supreme court,
however, rejected this definition in Trujeque.
B. The Defendant and Plaintiff's Cases
1. The Defendant's Case
The crux of Service Merchandise's argument was based on Gonzales
v. Shoprite Foods, Inc.,31 which was the foundation of the trial court's
jury instruction.3 2 In Gonzales, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
a store owner did not have exclusive control over a stack of merchandise
in the store because numerous customers had access to the merchandise. 33
Thus, others' access to the object defeated the defendant's exclusive
control over the object, thereby making res ipsa loquitur inapplicable.
Following this rationale, Service Merchandise argued that because other
customers, including Trujeque, had access to its chair, it did not have
exclusive control over the chair. 34
2. The Plaintiff's Case
Trujeque based her argument on the only two collapsing chair cases
in New Mexico, Tuso v. Markey" and Chapin v. Rogers.3 6 Trujeque
asserted that her case was distinguishable from Gonzales because it did
not involve stacked merchandise, but instead involved a chair.37 Fur-
thermore, Trujeque contended that, unlike the Gonzales case, neither of
the two collapsing chair cases required an analysis of others' access to
the chair. Trujeque argued that both these cases only required a showing
of management, ownership, and possession of the chair to establish
exclusive control.
In Tuso, a restaurant patron brought an action against a restaurant
for injuries sustained when one of its chairs collapsed. 38 The Tuso court
held that because the accident would not have happened had the owner
exercised due care in maintaining the chair, the patron was entitled to
rely on res ipsa loquitur. 9 Thus, the court found that the restaurant had
caused by plaintiff's negligence or have been due to one of several causes, for some of which the
defendant is not responsible." Id. at 364, 658 P.2d at 438 (quoting Hogan v. Miller, 314 P.2d
230, 236 (Cal. 1957)).
30. See supra note 15.
31. 69 N.M. 95, 364 P.2d 352 (1961).
32. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
33. Gonzales, 69 N.M. at 101, 364 P.2d at 358. The New Mexico Supreme Court stated, "with
equal access to merchandise, the merchandise can hardly be said to be within the sole and exclusive
control of the appellee." Id.
34. See supra note 8.
35. 61 N.M. 77, 294 P.2d 1102 (1956).
36. 80 N.M. 684, 459 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1969).
37. Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 389-90, 872 P.2d at 362-63.
38. Tuso, 61 N.M. at 79, 294 P.2d at 1104.
39. Id. at 80, 294 P.2d at 1105.
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exclusive control regardless of others' access since it was responsible for
the condition of the chair. Therefore, the court implied that exclusive
control was defined by the defendant's control over the chair, not others'
access to the chair.
Similarly, in Chapin, a customer brought suit against a restaurant for
injuries sustained when one of the restaurant's stools broke. 4 The trial
court instructed the jury that in order for the restaurant to be liable
under the theory of res ipsa loquitur, the patron must have established
that he did not participate or contribute to the accident. 4' The plaintiff
appealed, alleging that the court's instruction was erroneous. 42 The court
of appeals stated, "this condition or element has never been included in
the definition of the doctrine in New Mexico." ' 43 Thus, the Chapin court
held that the patron did not have to show that he did not contribute
to or participate in4" the accident in order to establish the defendant's
exclusive control over the stool.
C. The Trujeque Court Builds on the Collapsing Chair Cases
Although both the trial court and court of appeals in Trujeque found
the Gonzales rationale persuasive, the supreme court held it inapplicable
to a chair case 45 because it dealt with exclusive control only in the context
of stacked merchandise. On the other hand, the court found that the
two collapsing chair cases provided an alternative basis for defining
exclusive control. Both of the collapsing chair cases, Tuso and Chapin,
imply that exclusive control over collapsing chairs is defined by the nature
of the defendant's control over the chair, not others' access to the chair.
These cases, however, did not expressly state this alternative definition
of exclusive control. 46 Therefore, the New Mexico Supreme Court turned
to other jurisdictions for assistance in conceiving an explicit definition
of exclusive control in collapsing chair cases.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Several other jurisdictions focus on the nature of the defendant's
control, instead of others' access to the object when defining exclusive
control in collapsing chair cases.47 The Trujeque court found the rationale
of such jurisdictions persuasive. 4
40. Chapin, 80 N.M. at 684, 459 P.2d at 846.
41. Id. at 685, 459 P.2d at 847. Contributing to or participating in the accident is the equivalent
of access. This is because the plaintiff cannot contribute to or participate in the accident of the
collapsing chair unless the plaintiff had access to the chair.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 688, 459 P.2d at 850.
44. See supra note 41.
45. Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 392-93, 872 P.2d at 365-66. The supreme court held that stacked
merchandise was not a "safe" instrumentality like a chair. This was because customers could not
"anticipate the safe use" of stacked merchandise. Id.
46. Id. at 391, 872 P.2d at 364.
47. See, e.g., Finocchio v. Crest Hollow Club at Woodbury, Inc., 584 N.Y.S.2d 201 (N.Y.
1992) (holding that even though plaintiff had possession of the chair, possession will not negate
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In Herries v. Bond Stores, Inc. ,49 a customer filed suit against a store
for injuries that resulted from a store's collapsing chair. The Missouri
Court of Appeals held that although the customer used the chair, she
did not control the chair. 0 The Herries court suggested that because the
customer could not inspect the chair, she could not control the chair.5
The court stated that the "[d]efendant had the ownership, management,
and control of the chair, and had full opportunity to inspect the chair
and ascertain its actual defective condition .... ,,"2 Therefore, the Herries
court reasoned that the store's right to inspect the chair, and not the
customer's access to the chair, was determinative in defining exclusive
control.
Similarly, in Rose v. Melody Lane of Wilshire," the California Supreme
Court held that the determinative factor of whether a restaurant had
exclusive control over a stool was the nature of the restaurant's control.
5 4
The court concluded that although the patron used the stool, the restaurant
controlled the stool.5 The restaurant's control arose from the fact that
the restaurant was responsible for the stool's condition.16 The court stated,
"it was the condition of the stool, not the use made of it that was
responsible for the fall." '57 Thus, the restaurant was liable to the patron
on the basis of res ipsa loquitur.18
Although the majority of the cases from other jurisdictions focused
on the nature of the defendant's control when defining exclusive control
in collapsing chair cases,59 the Trujeque court was cognizant that other
jurisdictions rejected such an approach.
In Kilgore v. Shepard Co.,60 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
res ipsa loquitur inapplicable to a collapsing chair case when others had
access to the chair. 6 ' The Kilgore court reasoned that because others had
access to the chair, they controlled the chair.6 2 If people other than the
the inference of defendant's negligence when defendant was responsible for the chair's condition);
Judson v. Camelot Food, Inc., 756 P.2d 1198, 1201 (Nev. 1988) ("A business proprietor retains
exclusive control of seating while it is being properly used by patrons."); Benedict v. Eppley Hotel
Co., 65 N.W.2d 224 (Neb. 1954) (holding that evidence of defendant's ownership, possession, and
control were enough to establish exclusive control); Rose v. Melody Lane Wilshire, 247 P.2d 335
(Cal. 1952); Herries v. Bond Stores, Inc., 84 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935).
48. See Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 392-93, 872 P.2d at 364-65.
49. 84 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 157.
52. Id.
53. 247 P.2d 335 (Cal. 1952).
54. Id. at 338.
55. Id. "Plaintiff's actions had no more legal significance as a cause of the accident than those
of the innocent bystander in the typical res ipsa loquitur case." Id.
56. Id. "So far as construction, inspection, or maintenance of the stool were concerned, defendant
had exclusive control." Id. Thus, the court focused on the nature of the restaurant's control
(construction, inspection, or maintenance) when applying the exclusive control element.
57. Id. at 338.
58. Id.
59. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
60. 158 A. 720 (R.I. 1932).
61. Id. at 721.
62. Id.
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defendant controlled the chair, then their actions could have caused the
accident, thus negating the inference that the defendant's negligence caused
the accident. 63
Likewise, in Mineo v. Rand's Food Shops, Inc., 64 a New York Court
precluded the use of res ipsa loquitur in a collapsing chair case because
the plaintiff failed to establish the defendant's exclusive control over the
chair. 65 The Mineo court held that because others had access to the chair,
such individuals controlled the chair."
Both the Mineo and Kilgore courts concluded that the exclusive control
element was not satisfied when others had access to the chair. Although
most New Mexico cases define exclusive control in a similar manner ,67
such decisions have been "widely criticized as ridiculous conclusions. ' 6
Thus, the Trujeque court rejected this rationale. 69
V. ANALYSIS OF TRUJEQUE
A. The Purpose of Exclusive Control Warranting an Inference of
Negligence
By focusing on the nature of the defendant's control, the Trujeque
decision established an approach to res ipsa loquitur that warrants, not
compels, an inference of negligence.70 The purpose of the exclusive control
element is to reasonably eliminate all explanations of the accident, other
than the defendant's negligence. 7' "This does not mean that all other
possibilities must be eliminated, but only that their likelihood be reduced
so that the greater probability [of negligence] lies at the defendant's
door."' 72 Thus, the Trujeque decision defined exclusive control in a manner
consistent with its purpose.
Prior to Trujeque, plaintiffs had to address the question of whether
others' access to an object would preclude a finding of exclusive control.
Thus, to make a prima facie showing of exclusive control, a plaintiff
had to provide evidence that no one besides the defendant had access
63. See id.
64. 32 N.Y.S.2d 23 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941).
65. Id. at 25.
66. Id.
67. See supra note 15.
68. Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 392, 872 P.2d at 365 (citations omitted). See supra text accompanying
notes 16 & 17.
69. Id. The Trujeque court rejected this rationale because of the widespread criticism. This
rationale, however, was criticized because it improperly ignored the purpose of the exclusive control
element which was to draw an inference of the defendant's negligence. See supra note 16. "Only
in this narrow point does the incident 'speak for itself' . Strong v. Shaw, 96 N.M. 281, 283,
629 P.2d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1980).
70. Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 393, 872 P.2d at 366 (quoting Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233
(1913)) (emphasis added).
71. See Finocchio v. Crest Hollow Club at Woodbury, Inc., 584 N.Y.S.2d 201, 202 (N.Y. 1992)
(emphasis added).
72. Id. (quoting Dermatossian v. New York City Transit Auth., 492 N.E.2d 1200 (N.Y. 1986)
(citing 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 19.7, at 1086)).
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to an object.73 Such a requirement compels an inference of negligence
by eliminating all possible explanations of the accident. 74 If all explanations
other than the defendant's negligence are eliminated, then the plaintiff
actually establishes the cause of the accident-the defendant's negligence.
This approach actually goes beyond what is required for res ipsa loquitur,
the doctrine of inferences. 75
The Trujeque court, however, focused on the nature of the defendant's
control over the chair. Such an approach measures the probability of
the defendant's responsibility without actually establishing the defendant's
responsibility. Therefore, this alternative definition warrants an inference
of negligence by reasonably, not actually, eliminating all explanations of
the accident other than the defendant's negligence.
B. Exclusive Control Over a Chair-A Common Sense Idea
The Trujeque decision is more in line with the common sense idea
that there is a difference between access to a chair and control of that
chair. 76 Simply because a customer has access to a chair does not mean
that the customer controls the chair. The customer cannot paint the
chair, fix it, maintain it, and is not responsible for its condition.7 7 The
Trujeque court recognized this distinction between access and control,
stating that "all that the plaintiff should be required to do . . . is show
that the defendant owned, operated, and maintained" the chair.78 There-
fore, according to Trujeque's alternative definition, a defendant will have
exclusive control over a chair when the nature of the defendant's control
is such that the defendant is responsible for the condition of the chair.
C. The Limits of Trujeque
Although the Trujeque definition of exclusive control undoubtedly
applies to collapsing chair cases, the court failed to adequately delineate
the bounds in which this definition applies in other factual situations.
In fact, the Trujeque court insisted that it was not going to construct
a definitive meaning of exclusive control. 79 The court did state, however,
that the Trujeque definition is not applicable to cases dealing with stacked
73. See supra note 15.
74. If no one other than the defendant had access to the object, then all other explanations
are eliminated because there is no one else who may be liable for the accident.
75. See Tuso v. Markey, 61 N.M. 77, 80, 294 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1956) (The court stated, "had
appellant . . . established all the facts as to how the accident happened, ... , the doctrine [res
ipsa loquitur] would not be available."). See supra note 2. See, e.g., Strong v. Shaw, 96 N.M.
281, 283, 629 P.2d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 1980).
76. See Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 389, 872 P.2d at 362.
77. See id.; Rose v. Melody Lane Wilshire, 247 P.2d 335 (Cal. 1952) (stressing that there is a
difference in the characterization of one using [sitting in] a chair and one controlling [inspecting
or maintaining] a chair. Inspecting and/or maintaining a chair is more consistent with the char-
acteristics of control, not use.).
78. Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 393, 872 P.2d at 366 (quoting Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 43 S.E.
443, 445 (Ga. 1903)).
79. Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 390, 872 P.2d at 363. See supra note 3.
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merchandise.8 0 Thus, it appears that New Mexico has two definitions of
exclusive control.81
It is possible to construct an explanation of Trujeque's limitations. To
do so would require a court to focus not on the plaintiff's access to
the object nor the nature of the defendant's control over the object, but
on the object itself. The supreme court stated that Trujeque's definition
of exclusive control is applicable "when applied to an object, the an-
ticipated safe use of which ...would be reasonable for any number of
customers." '8 2 In other words, the Trujeque definition of exclusive control
may only be applicable when a case is dealing with an object that a
reasonable person would anticipate is safe, like a chair.83 Depending on
the nature of the object, the definition of exclusive control may vary.
Therefore, it is left to attorneys to argue the extent to which Trujeque
is applicable. 4
D. Implications of Trujeque
Depending on the limitations of the Trujeque decision, the Trujeque
definition of exclusive control may generate more litigation because it
may make it easier to proceed on a res ipsa loquitur claim. Plaintiffs
may no longer have to eliminate all possible explanations for an accident
in order to provide an inference of the defendant's negligence.85 Plaintiffs
may establish that the defendant controlled the object by merely showing
that the defendant was responsible for the condition of the object.8 6 This
greatly eases the plaintiffs' burden for a res ipsa loquitur claim.
80. Id. at 392, 872 P.2d at 365. The court specifically limited Trujeque's application of the
exclusive control element to exclude cases involving stacked merchandise. This is because Service
Merchandise relied on Gonzales, which applied the exclusive control element to stacked merchandise.
As mentioned earlier, the Trujeque court distinguished Gonzales on the basis that Gonzales involved
stacked merchandise, not a chair. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Thus, if the court
could not rely on the reasoning of Gonzales, a stacked merchandise case, then stacked merchandise
cases cannot rely on the reasoning of Trujeque, a chair case.
81. See Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 392, 872 P.2d at 365.
82. Id.
83. On the other hand, a reasonable person would not consider a heavy crate being unloaded
from a truck as safe. See Waterman v. Ciesielski, 87 N.M. 25, 528 P.2d 884 (1974). In Waterman
the court applied exclusive control by focusing on others' access to the crate, the approach taken
with unsafe objects. Id. at 27, 528 P.2d at 886.
84. This has already happened. In Mireles v. Broderick, 117 N.M. 445, 872 P.2d 863, 870
(1994), the supreme court applied the Trujeque approach to a medical malpractice action. In Mireles,
the plaintiff sued an anesthesiologist under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur for medical malpractice
claiming that the anesthesiologist failed to properly position and cushion the plaintiff's arm during
surgery. The plaintiff contended that this resulted in ulnar neuropathy. The defendant asserted that
since others (doctors, nurses, etc.) had access to the plaintiff during surgery, the plaintiff could
not establish that the defendant had exclusive control over her. However, the supreme court rejected
this approach, cited Trujeque, and focused on the nature of the defendant's control in analyzing
the exclusive control element. Thus, the court found that since the defendant was responsible for
the positioning and cushioning of the plaintiff's arm [nature of the defendant's control], the defendant
had the requisite control needed to satisfy the exclusive control element, regardless of others' access
to the plaintiff. See id.
85. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
86. See Trujeque, 117 N.M. at 393, 872 P.2d at 366.
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Furthermore, litigants may face procedural changes. Following Tru-
jeque, it may be more difficult for defendants to have plaintiffs' cases
dismissed. No longer will a plaintiff's failure to prove that no one else
had access to an object be sufficient grounds for dismissing a res ipsa
loquitur claim. Therefore, it is easier for plaintiffs to get to the jury on
the theory of res ipsa loquitur, thus increasing the plaintiffs' probability
of success.
On the other hand, defendants may have to be more cautious regarding
the safety of the physical environment they control. Because it is easier
for plaintiffs to show that defendants are responsible for the consequences
arising out of an object that they control,8 7 defendants may have to
virtually ensure the safety of every object they control. Such an outcome,
however, directly conflicts with New Mexico's policy that individuals are
not guarantors of the public's safety. 88
VI. CONCLUSION
Trujeque rejected most of the New Mexico precedent that involved the
definition of the exclusive control element for the rationale implicit in
two New Mexico collapsing chair cases and explicit in other jurisdictions.
In doing so, the court provided an alternative definition of exclusive
control in collapsing chair cases that is not dependent on others' access
to the chair, but on the nature of the defendant's control over the chair.
Under this approach, a defendant can no longer defeat a plaintiff's res
ipsa loquitur claim in a collapsing chair case by showing that others had
access to the chair. The Trujeque court, however, did not limit this
decision to collapsing chair cases, but left the door open for future courts
to apply Trujeque to any number of situations. Therefore, only time will
tell the extent of the impact of the Trujeque decision.
DAVID A. STANDRIDGE, JR.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Shoprite, 69 N.M. 95, 99, 364 P.2d 352, 356 (1961) (quoting Kitts
v. Shoprite Foods, Inc., 64 N.M. 24, 323 P.2d 284 (1958)).
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